As Nicaragua would do later, Yugoslavia and a growing number of Third World nations used the new group as a mechanism to chart their own course in foreign policy and development. Evolution of the movement witnessed increasing concern over political hegemony and economic domination, particularly by Western powers. Thus, as the focus shifted from world peace and maintaining scrupulous equidistance between East and West, the new emphasis became one of expressing solidarity with anti-colonial struggles, supporting the political economy of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), and openly criticizing perceived Western domination in political or economic areas (LeoGrande, 1980: 38, 39). Support for liberation movements gradually became the primary focus of the movement with some nations, like Yugoslavia and Algeria, warning of US and Soviet imperialism (the two imperialisms thesis) with another, Cuba, arguing that the Socialist countries were natural allies.l
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
If conditions proceeded to change rapidly in Africa and Asia, the traditional Inter-American system made nonalignment a different story in the Western Hemisphere, where, from the (1823) Monroe Doctrine onward, the United States had reserved for itself a hegemonic position. The United States was to be the first among equals and, as such, to enjoy certain rights and responsibilities foreclosed to lesser states. As industrial growth in the North economically outstripped the rural agrarianism of the South, the Latin American nations witnessed a variety of policy instruments: the big stick, gunboat and dollar diplomacy and, finally, the good neighbor policy. Though methods might vary, the end result was always the same, i. Peronism appeared to insulate Argentina from the Cold War preoccupation that increasingly colored US relations with its Latin neighbors. In 1954 Guatemalan attempts at internal structural change and a foreign policy involving minimal relations with Eastern Europe became the basis for a US campaign characterizing the regime as a beachhead for international communism. The subsequent CIA-sponsored (US Central Intelligence Agency) coup terminated Guatemala's experiment with an independent foreign policy. Bolivia's attempts at structural change, following its 1952 revolution, lasted only a few years until US-induced economic pressure served to moderate the course of revolution (see ; and Whitehead, 1969).
Interjection of the Cold War into the hemispheric system undercut attempts at maneuverability on the part of the Latin American nations, since it was assumed that common cultural, historic, economic, and political ties inextricably bound them to the West in the North American "cold war" with Eastern Communism. The Cuban case illustrates how the US reacted (or overreacted) to nationalist changes in internal or external economic and political relationships. Deviation from Western policies was perceived as both unwarranted and last occupation was in response to an indigenous guerrilla movement, Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of Nicaraguan National Sovereignty.
After Sandino was assassinated in 1934 and his army disbanded by the US-organized National Guard, the resulting Somoza family dictatorship remained in power until July of 1979 and was characterized by almost total subservience to North American policy interests. Peronism appeared to insulate Argentina from the Cold War preoccupation that increasingly colored US relations with its Latin neighbors. In 1954 Guatemalan attempts at internal structural change and a foreign policy involving minimal relations with Eastern Europe became the basis for a US campaign characterizing the regime as a beachhead for international communism. The subsequent CIA-sponsored (US Central Intelligence Agency) coup terminated Guatemala's experiment with an independent foreign policy. Bolivia's attempts at structural change, following its 1952 revolution, lasted only a few years until US-induced economic pressure served to moderate the course of revolution (see ; and Whitehead, 1969).
A Somoza could always deliver the Nicaraguan vote in crucial meetings of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS)
Interjection of the Cold War into the hemispheric system undercut attempts at maneuverability on the part of the Latin American nations, since it was assumed that common cultural, historic, economic, and political ties inextricably bound them to the West in the North American "cold war" with Eastern Communism. The Cuban case illustrates how the US reacted (or overreacted) to nationalist changes in internal or external economic and political relationships. Deviation from Western policies was perceived as both unwarranted and In Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future, Luigi Einaudi (1974:32) notes that "Latin American nationalism remains opposed to any form of dependence on Capitalist or Communist powers;" and, further, "most Latin American radicals envisage a form of neutralism in world politics, hoping... the sardines can find room between the sharks to swim safely." Revolutionary leaders who active movement toward communism. The kind of foreign policy initiatives that characterized India's relations with the superpowers were tolerated in Asia but prohibited in neighboring Latin America.
In 1961 twenty-five nations convened in Belgrade for the first conference of nonaligned nations. Cuba's was the only Latin American delegation. "Havana's presence signalled that Cuba's international perspective was undergoing change; the hemispheric parameters that historically had defined its sphere of concern were being replaced with a vision of itself operating in concert with kindred AfroAsian states on the larger world stage" (Erisman, 1983: 150) . The United States reacted negatively. As Cuba sought new external alignments, US displeasure increased and was ultimately expressed by the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. At North American initiative, Cuba was excluded from full participation in the Inter-American system in 1962. Not only did this act strain the system, but it encouraged Cuba to offset its diplomatic isolation through more committed integration into the Nonaligned Movement, and (at different times) through strengthening ties with the Soviet Union and China.
The economic and political realities of the sixties, the example of Cuba, and a general increase in Third World independence and assertiveness combined to encourage other Latin American nations to re-evaluate foreign policy options. By the late 1970's an increasing number of Latin Americans experienced a growing affinity with the kind of Third World nationalism emanating from meetings of the Nonaligned Movement. In the years that followed, the movement came to include several Latin American nations, not only Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru but also Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama. Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico attended conferences as observers. The once-small group of twenty-five had expanded to nearly one hundred nations by the time the FSLN defeated Somoza's forces in July of 1979.
NICARAGUA AND THE HISTORIC ROOTS OF NONALIGNMENT
In Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future, Luigi Einaudi (1974:32) notes that "Latin American nationalism remains opposed to any form of dependence on Capitalist or Communist powers;" and, further, "most Latin American radicals envisage a form of neutralism in world politics, hoping... the sardines can find room between the sharks to swim safely." Revolutionary leaders who active movement toward communism. The kind of foreign policy initiatives that characterized India's relations with the superpowers were tolerated in Asia but prohibited in neighboring Latin America.
The economic and political realities of the sixties, the example of Cuba, and a general increase in Third World independence and assertiveness combined to encourage other Latin American nations to re-evaluate foreign policy options. By the late 1970's an increasing number of Latin Americans experienced a growing affinity with the kind of Third World nationalism emanating from meetings of the Nonaligned Movement. In the years that followed, the movement came to include several Latin American nations, not only Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru but also Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama. Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico attended conferences as observers. The once-small group of twenty-five had expanded to nearly one hundred nations by the time the FSLN defeated Somoza's forces in July of 1979. : NICARAGUA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  VANDEN/QUEISER: NICARAGUA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  VANDEN/QUEISER: NICARAGUA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  VANDEN/QUEISER: NICARAGUA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT emerged in Nicaragua were both radical and nationalistic and hoped to chart an independent course as the nation experienced its second revolution for national sovereignty. Indeed, it would appear that the Cubans had warned them of the dangers inherent in alienating one shark only to be forced to swim in the wake of another.
NICARAGUA AND THE HISTORIC ROOTS
Less than two months after the new government was established in Managua, Nicaragua decided to become a member of the Nonaligned Movement and to send a delegation to the Sixth Nonaligned Summit, scheduled to convene in Havana early in September 1979. Declaring that the Sandinistas favored a restructuring of international relations on the basis of justice together with a new international economic order, junta member Daniel Ortega (1982:320) explained that the Nicaraguans were joining the Nonaligned Movement because they saw it as "the broadest organization of the Third World states that play an important role and exercise increasing influence in the international arena and in the people's struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism ..." Nicaragua was clearly taking a different tack from the days when Somoza had declared he was the best friend the US ever had. Subsequently, it would seek to diversify its diplomatic and economic relations even more.
To understand reasons for such a shift in Nicaraguan foreign policy one needs to examine evolution of the Sandinista movement. The object of the nationalism of the original Sandino was to affirm the principle of national sovereignty and independence. He identified his struggle with that of an oppressed people and believed that all those who suffered oppression should unite in a common struggle (Barricada Internacional, 1984:2). His nationalism sought to liberate Nicaragua from direct military intervention by, and the political and economic dominance of, the United States. Sandino's definition of sovereignty was fundamentally anti-hegemonic. Although he antedated the nonaligned movement, Sandino's appeal to continental and global opinion demonstrated the principle of popular solidarity and national self-determination which would become the hallmark of the Third World movement in Asia and Africa. Characteristically anti-colonial, his manifestoes were addressed to struggling peoples everywhere: to the Nicaraguan people, the people of America, the Indo-Latin American continent, and to all progressive forces (see . His anti-colonial sentiment grew out of Nicaraguan historical experience and was later to be developed by the FSLN as the basis of contemporary Sandinista foreign policy. Thus the Nonaligned Movement provided a "natural, friendly" forum in which to emerged in Nicaragua were both radical and nationalistic and hoped to chart an independent course as the nation experienced its second revolution for national sovereignty. Indeed, it would appear that the Cubans had warned them of the dangers inherent in alienating one shark only to be forced to swim in the wake of another.
To understand reasons for such a shift in Nicaraguan foreign policy one needs to examine evolution of the Sandinista movement. The object of the nationalism of the original Sandino was to affirm the principle of national sovereignty and independence. He identified his struggle with that of an oppressed people and believed that all those who suffered oppression should unite in a common struggle (Barricada Internacional, 1984:2). His nationalism sought to liberate Nicaragua from direct military intervention by, and the political and economic dominance of, the United States. Sandino's definition of sovereignty was fundamentally anti-hegemonic. Although he antedated the nonaligned movement, Sandino's appeal to continental and global opinion demonstrated the principle of popular solidarity and national self-determination which would become the hallmark of the Third World movement in Asia and Africa. Characteristically anti-colonial, his manifestoes were addressed to struggling peoples everywhere: to the Nicaraguan people, the people of America, the Indo-Latin American continent, and to all progressive forces (see . Through the Nonaligned Movement, Nicaragua began to seek support outside the Inter-American System.
As was true of other Third World countries, the historical roots of Sandinista nonalignment were also socio-economic. The new foreign policy which emerged in 1979 was but the external reflection of an internal realignment of class and economic forces destined to revolutionize both domestic and foreign policies. When the Somocista system of economic and political domination was broken, with it went its "captive" foreign policy. Pre-revolutionary dependencies were challenged; the national interest was defined on Nicaraguan (not US) terms. Greater diversification in diplomatic and economic relations was sought as a way to achieve the new national goals. Nicaragua would no longer automatically follow the US (or Western) lead on policy issues. Rather, it would pursue a foreign policy based on its redefined interests. Specific goals might change, but fundamental tenets would include nonalignment, anti-colonialism, and pluralism in internal politics and international relations.
Nonalignment came to express a newfound independence. From a foreign policy which had faithfully "echoed" the opposition of the United States in international and regional forums, like the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) (Nicaragua had endorsed the intervention in Guatemala in 1954, and had permitted the use of Puerto Cabezas for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba), Nicaraguan foreign policy became fiercely independent. Nonalignment seemed the most effective way to protect its new autonomy. Unlike its past subservience to US interests, Nicaraguan nonalignment might in future mean criticism of the North American position in Latin America and the Third World. However, this would not necessarily mean that Nicaraguan foreign policy was categorically hostile to that of the United States, but that the new regime reserved the right to judge other nations' actions according to its own criteria. Nicaraguan nonalignment must, therefore, be understood within the context of the country's revolutionary experience.
The struggle from Sandino to the present imposed a psychological, moral, and even political commitment to support other liberation efforts. A basic condition of membership in the Nonaligned Movement was support for anti-colonial liberation movements. express the new policy goals of political pluralism, mixed economy and international nonalignment. The September 1979 Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned countries in Havana provided an ideal occasion to announce the new Nicaraguan foreign policy . Through the Nonaligned Movement, Nicaragua began to seek support outside the Inter-American System.
Nonalignment came to express a newfound independence. Initially, the declaration prepared by Nicaragua and Cuba "called specifically for condemnation of US support for antiSandinista groups based in Honduras" (Riding, 1983b:4) . Subsequently, however, some of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) moderates sympathetic to the United States (such as Jamaica, Egypt, and Singapore) were able to "soften" the final draft,2 so that it called merely for peaceful resolution of the differences between the warring groups in El Salvador, and for negotiations to take place between the United States and Nicaragua. It was significant, though, that the meeting concentrated primarily upon the situation in Central America, the first time the NAM had devoted so much of its attention to one region of the world, and particularly to Latin America . Henceforth Latin American problems would no longer be the exclusive province of the OAS, so often dominated by the US, nor would Nicaragua be isolated from the world movement it had helped to develop.
The Managua meeting also served two other functions: (1) it set the stage to continue discussion of the Central American situation at the upcoming summit conference scheduled to be held in New Delhi two months later (7-12 March, 1983); and (2) it contributed to a marshalling of diplomatic support when, also in March 1983, Nicaragua brought complaints of acts of aggression directed against itself before the Security Council.
Nicaragua had already reaped some rewards from its new internationalized foreign policy the previous Fall, when it had been elected as one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council on 19 October 1982. At the time the United States had lobbied vigorously against Nicaragua for this position, preferring to support the nomination of the Dominican Republic instead. Despite this powerful opponent Nicaragua had succeeded in mustering the 104 country votes needed to acquire the two-thirds majority. Nicaragua's election was widely perceived as a major defeat for the United States (Keesing's, 1983: 31933).3 The election was significant in that it also provided Nicaragua with immediate access to the Security Council in the event of a threat to its national security.4
Six months later, on 23 March 1983, Nicaragua took advantage of this status and requested that the Security Council convene to hear such a charge. Nicaragua denounced US aggression in the form of increasing counter-revolutionary attacks from Honduras, suggest-(attention) on the growing number of attacks by Honduras-based anti-Sandinista rebels into northern Nicaragua" :7) .
Initially, the declaration prepared by Nicaragua and Cuba "called specifically for condemnation of US support for antiSandinista groups based in Honduras" (Riding, 1983b:4) . Subsequently, however, some of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) moderates sympathetic to the United States (such as Jamaica, Egypt, and Singapore) were able to "soften" the final draft,2 so that it called merely for peaceful resolution of the differences between the warring groups in El Salvador, and for negotiations to take place between the United States and Nicaragua. It was significant, though, that the meeting concentrated primarily upon the situation in Central America, the first time the NAM had devoted so much of its attention to one region of the world, and particularly to Latin America . Henceforth Latin American problems would no longer be the exclusive province of the OAS, so often dominated by the US, nor would Nicaragua be isolated from the world movement it had helped to develop.
Six months later, on 23 March 1983, Nicaragua took advantage of this status and requested that the Security Council convene to hear such a charge. Nicaragua denounced US aggression in the form of increasing counter-revolutionary attacks from Honduras, suggest-(attention) on the growing number of attacks by Honduras-based anti-Sandinista rebels into northern Nicaragua" (Riding, 1983a:7) .
Nicaragua had already reaped some rewards from its new internationalized foreign policy the previous Fall, when it had been elect- Initially, the declaration prepared by Nicaragua and Cuba "called specifically for condemnation of US support for antiSandinista groups based in Honduras" (Riding, 1983b:4) . Subsequently, however, some of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) moderates sympathetic to the United States (such as Jamaica, Egypt, and Singapore) were able to "soften" the final draft,2 so that it called merely for peaceful resolution of the differences between the warring groups in El Salvador, and for negotiations to take place between the United States and Nicaragua. It was significant, though, that the meeting concentrated primarily upon the situation in Central America, the first time the NAM had devoted so much of its attention to one region of the world, and particularly to Latin America . Henceforth Latin American problems would no longer be the exclusive province of the OAS, so often dominated by the US, nor would Nicaragua be isolated from the world movement it had helped to develop.
Nicaragua had already reaped some rewards from its new internationalized foreign policy the previous Fall, when it had been elect- Countries frequently allied with the United States in the past were now either skeptical or openly critical of US policy in Central America, specifically as it affected Nicaragua. Among them were Mexico, Venezuela, Spain, Pakistan, India, the Netherlands, Panama, and France. Support for Nicaragua was even stronger among sympathetic nonaligned nations like Tanzania, Zaire and Algeria. Jeane Kirkpatrick was so annoyed at their attitude that she was quoted as having roundly condemned the "systematic bias, systematic lies, systematic redefinition of key political values and distortion of key political processes" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983b: 18) .6 This development certainly validated Nicaragua's policy of nonalignment which had intended to use the Third World movement not just as a forum for dissemination of objective, sympathetic information on the Nicaraguan revolution, but as a medium for diplomatic defense and initiative. Tellingly, only Honduras and El Salvador sided strongly with the United States in the UN debates. The Nonaligned Movement, and through it, other nonaligned Third World countries in the United Nations, came to the defense of the Nicaraguan revolution. Unlike Guatemala in 1954, Nicaragua was not isolated and overthrown by a CIAbacked invasion. Nicaraguan diplomacy had guaranteed its access to Third World countries and extra-hemispheric organizations not subordinated to policy constraints imposed by regional US hegemony.
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION: THE SEVENTH SUMMIT AND AFTER
At the very first meeting of the NAM attended by Nicaragua, in 1979, paniel Ortega had linked consolidation of the Nicaraguan Revolution with strengthening the struggle of other underdeveloped nations. At the Seventh Summit he made it clear that the struggle for liberation in Nicaragua continued, and that Nicaragua "needed the disinterested assistance of the nonaligned nations" more than ever (U.N. Chronicle, 1983b:25) . Both these and subsequent declara-150 150 150 150
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tions indicated two important aspects of Nicaraguan foreign policy in its relations with the Third World. Like Guatemala and Cuba at an earlier time, Nicaragua was totally occupied with the security threat posed by the US, and feared for consolidation of its revolution. Unlike Cuba between 1959 and 1962, however, Nicaragua decided to create the appropriate international climate for revolutionary consolidation by establishing close solidarity with the Third World, rather than with the Soviet Union.7 Internationalism, but of a somewhat different variety than the internationalism of Cuba, was seen as a major weapon for national self-defense. Through a "diversified dependence" on many different nations, but with special ties to the nonaligned countries, Nicaragua hoped to fend off aggressive actions by the US.8 Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua was able to avoid a hemispheric diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States. As more and more Latin American countries joined the Nonaligned Movement (at New Delhi membership increased to 101 countries including 10 Latin American and Caribbean members) it became more difficult to isolate Nicaragua in the same way as had been done with Cuba. The new arena was broader, the national actors more independent.
Nicaragua attempted to act as a bridge between the positions of the radical members of the Nonaligned Movement and the proWestern countries. It accepted neither the "natural ally" thesis of Cuba, which saw in the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, a natural alliance of dependent, developing countries; nor had Nicaragua espoused the "two imperialisms" thesis of Algeria, who feared domination of both advanced capitalist and advanced socialist systems over dependent countries :157-164 and Envio, 1983:10). Nicaragua's preferred position in previous summits appeared to be with the "pivotal" states (like Tanzania). These were not as radical as the Cubans but more radical than the Yugoslavs: they were in the middle of the nonaligned group.9 This "middle group" practiced true "flexible nonalignment," at times siding with the radicals and at others with the moderates, depending upon issue and circumstance. Nicaragua, in confronting the military and economic opposition of the United States, and the extensive needs of revolutionary reconstruction, could not afford ideological, or any other form of, exclusivity. Moreover, its policy in action, as well as in philosophy, proved to be genuinely "more" nonaligned than that of Cuba.
A major issue confronted Nicaragua shortly after its revolution, and after its delegation had been seated in the United Nations: the tions indicated two important aspects of Nicaraguan foreign policy in its relations with the Third World. Like Guatemala and Cuba at an earlier time, Nicaragua was totally occupied with the security threat posed by the US, and feared for consolidation of its revolution. Unlike Cuba between 1959 and 1962, however, Nicaragua decided to create the appropriate international climate for revolutionary consolidation by establishing close solidarity with the Third World, rather than with the Soviet Union.7 Internationalism, but of a somewhat different variety than the internationalism of Cuba, was seen as a major weapon for national self-defense. Through a "diversified dependence" on many different nations, but with special ties to the nonaligned countries, Nicaragua hoped to fend off aggressive actions by the US.8 Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua was able to avoid a hemispheric diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States. As more and more Latin American countries joined the Nonaligned Movement (at New Delhi membership increased to 101 countries including 10 Latin American and Caribbean members) it became more difficult to isolate Nicaragua in the same way as had been done with Cuba. The new arena was broader, the national actors more independent.
A major issue confronted Nicaragua shortly after its revolution, and after its delegation had been seated in the United Nations: the 151 151 151 151 Nicaragua's interpretation of nonalignment was not always one of neutrality, as illustrated by the Nicaraguan position on the US invasion of Grenada. In October 1983, Nicaragua initiated a resolution in the Security Council to end armed intervention in Grenada and to begin immediate withdrawal of troops, deploring this as a violation of international law by the US. When the resolution was vetoed by the US, in the Security Council, Nicaragua then reintroduced it in the General Assembly in November, where the US action was deplored by a vote of 108 for and 9 against, with 27 abstaining. Nicaragua not only supported the resolution but was its author and promoter. In the debate Nicaragua described the US intervention as "naked armed aggression" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983a:15) . Some observers interpreted the Grenada vote as proof of Nicaragua's anti-American (and, by implication, pro-Soviet) alignment. An alternative explanation flows from an appreciation of the geographical proximity of Grenada to Nicaragua and the comparisons that had previously been made between Grenada and Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration and by the Nicaraguans themselves, in which the Grenadian intervention had been described as a "dry run" for Nicaragua. Faced with an apparent threat to its security, the Nicaraguans reasoned that the Grenadian intervention was a precedent which had to be forcefully condemned both to uphold the principle of non-intervention and to protect the Nicaraguan revolution.
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If the United States interpreted the Nicaraguan votes on Afghanistan and Grenada in terms of "he who is not with us is against us,"1 the nonaligned nations did not. Nicaragua's election to the Security Council, in contrast to the earlier failure of Cuba to be so elected, indicated that Nicaragua had been accepted by the Nonaligned nations as one of them. In contrast to Nicaragua's election to the Security Council, Cuba's 1980 bid for a council seat had been blocked by India and Nigeria, and the election deadlocked after 156 ballots. Although Cuba chaired the Nonaligned Movement at the time, it was viewed by many in the movement as too radical and not truly nonaligned (LeoGrande, 1980:50). The support for Nicaragua's charges of US aggression at the March 1983 New Delhi Seventh Summit of Nonaligned nations and in the United Nations in March, May, and September of the same year, all evidenced the growing acceptance of Nicaragua among members of the NAM and the world community at large. At the 38th General Assembly Daniel Ortega emphasized this point: "There is agreement among very different ideological positions throughout the world in condemning the aggressive and belNicaragua's interpretation of nonalignment was not always one of neutrality, as illustrated by the Nicaraguan position on the US invasion of Grenada. In October 1983, Nicaragua initiated a resolution in the Security Council to end armed intervention in Grenada and to begin immediate withdrawal of troops, deploring this as a violation of international law by the US. When the resolution was vetoed by the US, in the Security Council, Nicaragua then reintroduced it in the General Assembly in November, where the US action was deplored by a vote of 108 for and 9 against, with 27 abstaining. Nicaragua not only supported the resolution but was its author and promoter. In the debate Nicaragua described the US intervention as "naked armed aggression" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983a:15). Some observers interpreted the Grenada vote as proof of Nicaragua's anti-American (and, by implication, pro-Soviet) alignment. An alternative explanation flows from an appreciation of the geographical proximity of Grenada to Nicaragua and the comparisons that had previously been made between Grenada and Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration and by the Nicaraguans themselves, in which the Grenadian intervention had been described as a "dry run" for Nicaragua. Faced with an apparent threat to its security, the Nicaraguans reasoned that the Grenadian intervention was a precedent which had to be forcefully condemned both to uphold the principle of non-intervention and to protect the Nicaraguan revolution.
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licose escalation occurring in the Central American region and in demanding that dialogue be the means for resolving these problems" (U.N. Chronicle, 1984a:12) .
In the Nonaligned Movement, as in the United Nations, Nicaragua avoided siding with either the most radical or the most conservative blocs. Unless its national interest or foreign policy goals were directly involved, Nicaragua has tried to establish a position both flexible and conciliatory, strongly affirming the principle of nonalignment while emphasizing opposition to imperialism and support for liberation struggles. Nicaragua perceives unity as the movement's greatest strength and exerting leverage in the international forum, especially in the reform of the international economic system, a major Nicaragua goal.
In the first UN session in which the Sandinista government was represented, Daniel Ortega employed the term "the unity of the weak'" and, at the 1983 Managua NAM ministerial meeting, he explained the Nicaraguan position:
It is true that ours are countries with their own characteristics and even with diverse ideological and political positions, but they are also countries with shared problems and objectives. Ours are poor, dependent countries in an unfair economic order that are exposed to political, military and economic attacks and pressures; countries that cannot win the battle for justice and freedom individually; countries that need large-scale solidarity in order to stand up against the oppression that the colonial, industrial, and technological metropoles have institutionalized, bringing pain and poverty to our peoples. Therefore, the most important thing to preserve is the unity of this Movement. Our enemy knows of our differences and will try to play on them in order to divide, fragment and destroy us (NAM, 1983:37-38).
The Seventh Summit of the Movement highlighted the convergence of Third World interests and goals with those of Nicaraguan foreign policy. Defense of the Nicaraguan revolution and its consolidation by means of Third World solidarity would benefit both Nicaragua and the Nonaligned Movement, Nicaragua argued. Daniel Ortega even termed Nicaragua as the "strategic reserve of the Nonaligned Countries Movement" (Nicaragua. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, 1983:42). The 7th summit (March 1983) issued the strongest denunciation to that date of contra and US acts of aggression against Nicaragua, described there as "a deliberate plan to harass and destabilize that country" (CIC, 1983:15).
Continued attacks on Nicaraguan territory, mining of its harbors, and several naval attacks prompted Nicaragua's foreign ministry licose escalation occurring in the Central American region and in demanding that dialogue be the means for resolving these problems" (U.N. Chronicle, 1984a:12) .
It is true that ours are countries with their own characteristics and even with diverse ideological and political positions, but they are also countries with shared problems and objectives. Ours are poor, dependent countries in an unfair economic order that are exposed to political, military and economic attacks and pressures; countries that cannot win the battle for justice and freedom individually; countries that need large-scale solidarity in order to stand up against the oppression that the colonial, industrial, and technological metropoles have institutionalized, bringing pain and poverty to our peoples. Therefore, the most important thing to preserve is the unity of this Movement. Our enemy knows of our differences and will try to play on them in order to divide, fragment and destroy us (NAM, 1983:37-38). Continued attacks on Nicaraguan territory, mining of its harbors, and several naval attacks prompted Nicaragua's foreign ministry licose escalation occurring in the Central American region and in demanding that dialogue be the means for resolving these problems" (U.N. Chronicle, 1984a:12) .
The Seventh Summit of the
It is true that ours are countries with their own characteristics and even with diverse ideological and political positions, but they are also countries with shared problems and objectives. Ours are poor, dependent countries in an unfair economic order that are exposed to political, military and economic attacks and pressures; countries that cannot win the battle for justice and freedom individually; countries that need large-scale solidarity in order to stand up against the oppression that the colonial, industrial, and technological metropoles have institutionalized, bringing pain and poverty to our peoples. Therefore, the most important thing to preserve is the unity of this Movement. Our enemy knows of our differences and will try to play on them in order to divide, fragment and destroy us (NAM, 1983:37-38). Since 1979, the Sandinista regime has charted a new, highly independent foreign policy course. In so doing, it not only placed itself squarely within the Nonaligned Movement but was able to bring the Movement's perspectives and politics to bear on Nicaragua's position as an independent state in a region traditionally dominated by assumptions of US hegemony. This new foreign policy has maximized the decisionmaking latitude of Nicaragua and made nonalignment much more possible for other Latin American states. When the Reagan regime was unsympathetic to Nicaragua, through initiatives at Nonaligned Summit meetings and in the UN, the Sandinista government achieved a series of diplomatic successes and foreign policy firsts, and, on at least one occasion even managed to isolate the US in the United Nations on the basis of the latter's aggressive actions toward Nicaragua.
True to its origins and to its nonaligned foreign policy, Nicaragua has carefully cultivated relations with the Nonaligned Movement and has used these ties to acquire support at a crucial time in the development of its revolution. Thus, at the very time that the US was increasing external pressure on Nicaragua in early 1983, the Nicaraguan government succeeded in hosting a special meeting of Since 1979, the Sandinista regime has charted a new, highly independent foreign policy course. In so doing, it not only placed itself squarely within the Nonaligned Movement but was able to bring the Movement's perspectives and politics to bear on Nicaragua's position as an independent state in a region traditionally dominated by assumptions of US hegemony. This new foreign policy has maximized the decisionmaking latitude of Nicaragua and made nonalignment much more possible for other Latin American states. When the Reagan regime was unsympathetic to Nicaragua, through initiatives at Nonaligned Summit meetings and in the UN, the Sandinista government achieved a series of diplomatic successes and foreign policy firsts, and, on at least one occasion even managed to isolate the US in the United Nations on the basis of the latter's aggressive actions toward Nicaragua.
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